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ABSTRACT
Within hours of its announcement, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Citizens United v. FEC came under attack from progressive
groups. Among these groups were some of America’s largest labor
unions—even though the decision applies equally to unions and for-
profit corporations. The reason is clear: there exist both practical and
structural impediments that will prevent unions from benefitting
from Citizens United to the same extent as corporations. Therefore,
Citizens United stands to unleash a torrent of corporate electioneer-
ing that could drown out the countervailing voice of organized labor. 
This Article, however, takes a broader view of Citizens United to
explore a possible silver lining for labor. It posits that, in articulating
a wide-ranging vision of associations’ free speech rights, the Court
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undermined the intellectual basis of a lengthy string of cases that
has limited the First Amendment protection applicable to labor-
related speech in other contexts, such as picketing, boycotting, and
striking. Additionally, by discounting the First Amendment interests
of dissenting shareholders, Citizens United calls into question the
validity of restrictions on unions’ use of lawfully collected dues and
fees for political speech and new organizing. Accordingly, this Article
concludes that Citizens United has the potential to impact signifi-
cantly unions’ First Amendment rights outside of the campaign
finance arena.
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INTRODUCTION
Today the US Supreme Court lifted the floodgates and started
dismantling century-old restrictions on corporate electoral
activity in the name of the “free speech rights” of corporations—
meaning if you are a “corporate person” (aka a CEO or corporate
official), you are now free to hit the corporate ATM and spend
whatever of your shareholders’ money it takes to elect the
candidates of your choice.
—Anna Burger, former Secretary-Treasurer of the Service
Employees International Union, commenting on Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission.1
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission  made headlines for its controversial holding2
that corporations have the same First Amendment rights as people
to engage in independent election-related speech.  Predictably,3
much of the reaction focused on the extent to which Citizens United
would afford corporations greater influence over the outcomes of
elections, leading opponents of expanded corporate power—in-
cluding labor unions—to condemn the decision. Yet Citizens United
also applies to labor unions, freeing them to spend general treasury
funds on electioneering —and raising the question of why unions’4
reactions to Citizens United were nearly universally negative. 
On one hand, the answer to this question is apparent: when it
comes to election-related speech, Citizens United is a net loss to
unions, as compared to corporations.  For several reasons, unions5
1. Press Release, SEIU, Batten Down the Hatches: Supreme Court Opens Floodgates for
Corporate Spending in Elections (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.seiu.org/2010/01/batten-down-
the-hatches-supreme-court-opens-floodgates-for-corporate-spending-in-elections.php. Anna
Burger retired from the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) on August 11, 2010,
after serving as Secretary-Treasurer from 2001 until 2010 and as the first chair of the labor
federation Change to W in from 2005 until 2010. Anna Burger, SEIU, http://www.seiu.org/
a/ourunion/anna-burger.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
2. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
3. Id. at 903 (“[T]he First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based
on a speaker’s corporate identity.”). 
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.
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are unlikely to realize much benefit from being relieved of the
obligation to channel certain election advocacy through a political
action committee. First, unlike small businesses and associations
that may have been deterred from engaging in election advocacy
because of the difficulty of creating a political action committee
(PAC), many unions either already operate PACs or are affiliated
with parent unions that do. Second, even without the accounting
and reporting requirements that come with operating a PAC, unions
must still comply with other segregation and reporting require-
ments in order to avoid spending fees submitted by nonmembers on
political speech. Third, although Citizens United freed unions to
spend money derived from sources other than union dues on
political speech, it is unlikely that there is much such money to
spend.
However, Citizens United ’s broad articulation of First
Amendment principles also has the potential to expand unions’
First Amendment rights outside of the election context. In particu-
lar, Citizens United undermines the reasoning by which the Court
has repeatedly—and at times inexplicably—upheld limitations on
unions’ picketing and boycott activity and made it more difficult for
unions to obtain and use for political speech dues and fees paid by
represented workers. Thus, Citizens United has the potential to
expand what unions can say, how they can say it, and how they can
pay for that speech.
To reach this conclusion, this Article looks beyond a narrow
reading of Citizens United that is limited to the campaign finance
arena and instead focuses on the Court’s articulation of broader
First Amendment principles as applied to unions and corporations.
Specifically, the Court: 
! rejected the argument that some methods of conveying an idea
could be restricted provided other methods are available,
particularly when those other methods are less effective;
! placed no importance on whether a particular speaker sought
to speak in pursuit of profit, rather than engage in self-expres-
sion, pursue social change, or vindicate a similar purpose;
! placed significant importance on the rights of listeners to hear
all available viewpoints;
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! rejected as a rationale for limiting corporate speech the fact
that corporations may express views not held by their share-
holders;
! stated, without discussion, that a corporation was an associa-
tion; and 
! implied that associations have First Amendment rights that
are independent from those of their members.6
This Article argues that these principles cannot be reconciled
with the Court’s decisions upholding the constitutionality of existing
limits on labor speech, including Congress’s prohibition of certain
union-led strikes and boycotts, antitrust limitations on labor
organizing and striking by workers who are not covered by labor
law, and judge-made law protecting “objecting” workers from having
to contribute to union political speech. Part I of this Article extracts
from Citizens United the relevant principles of First Amendment
law that the Court applied to corporations and unions. Part II de-
scribes what this Article calls Citizens United’s “direct” and “indi-
rect” effects on labor speech and discusses why Citizens United may
be a net loss in terms of unions’ election speech but a win in terms
of broader labor speech rights. Finally, Part III addresses some
reasons that courts may not adopt this analysis. 
I. CITIZENS UNITED ’S FIRST AMENDMENT
The Citizens United petitioners challenged section 203 of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act  (BCRA), which banned corpora-7
tions and unions from spending general treasury funds on direct
political advocacy for or against federal candidates,  as well as on8
“electioneering communications,”  which merely refer to candidates9
for federal office shortly before an election. Specifically, Citizens
United, a nonprofit corporation, sought to use its general treasury
funds to make available via “video-on-demand” a ninety-minute
6. See infra Part I.
7. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
8. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886. 
9. BCRA defined “[a]n electioneering communication ... as any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office” within
thirty days of a federal primary or sixty days of a federal general election. Id. at 877 (quoting
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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documentary that was sharply critical of Hillary Clinton.  Because10
it wished to distribute the video within sixty days of the 2008 pres-
idential election, and because Citizens United accepted corporate
funding, BCRA’s ban at least arguably applied.  11
The Court began by addressing a number of narrow arguments
that BCRA did not apply to Citizens United’s documentary.  Among12
them was Citizens United’s argument that BCRA could not consti-
tutionally be applied to video-on-demand because that medium
required a potential viewer to take “a series of affirmative steps” in
order to watch the program and thus had a relatively low risk of
distorting the political process.  The Court brusquely rejected this13
argument, stating that “any effort by the Judiciary to decide which
means of communication are to be preferred for the particular type
of message and speaker would raise questions as to the courts’ own
lawful authority,” and that, in any event, the line-drawing process
would be “questionable” and would chill protected speech.  Thus,14
even though some forms of speech are much less likely to reach lis-
teners, the Court refused to distinguish between different methods
of conveying a particular message—either all methods would be
available, or none would.
Having dispensed with that and other relatively narrow argu-
ments, the Court turned to the facial challenge to BCRA’s independ-
ent expenditure provision.  The Court began by noting that the ban15
would apply to advocacy organizations such as the Sierra Club, the
National Rifle Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union,
and that such application would constitute “classic examples of cen-
sorship.”  Indeed, the majority opinion discussed for-profit corpora-16
tions and advocacy organizations essentially interchangeably, all
under the rubric of “associations,”  with the only nod toward the17
10. Id. at 887.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 888-96.
13. Id. at 890.
14. Id. at 890-91.
15. Id. at 894.
16. Id. at 897.
17. Id. at 900 (“The Court has thus rejected the argument that the political speech of
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment
simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’”); id. at 904 (“If the First
Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations
of citizens, for sim ply engaging in political speech.”); id. at 906-07 (“Austin ... permits the
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possibility of distinguishing between them—and an ambivalent one
at that—coming in Justice Scalia’s concurrence.  Thus, the Court18
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce—which upheld
campaign finance restrictions that applied to corporations but not
unions or advocacy groups —because that holding “permit[ted] the19
Government to ban the political speech of millions of associations of
citizens.”  Further, the Court implied that, as associations, cor-20
porations had First Amendment rights independent from those of
their constituent shareholders or members. Specifically, the Court
concluded that BCRA was overinclusive in part because it encom-
passed small corporations controlled either by one person or by a
handful of people.  But, given that those people could engage in21
virtually identical political speech in their personal capacities, it is
difficult to see whose First Amendment rights would be impeded
under BCRA—unless the corporation has its own First Amendment
rights.
The Court continued, concluding that the harms of stifling cor-
porate, or associational, speech were not alleviated by the fact that
corporations were free to form political action committees that could
make independent expenditures, subject to funding restrictions and
reporting requirements.  Here, the Court listed in detail the22
various reporting requirements that apply to PACs, concluding that,
Government to ban the political speech of millions of associations of citizens.”); id. at 908 (“Yet
certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form—are
penalized for engaging in the same political speech.”).
18. Id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he individual person’s right to speak includes
the right to speak in association with other individual persons.... The association of
individuals in a business corporation is no different—or at least it cannot be denied the right
to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not ‘an individual American.’”); see also id. at 927
(“Both corporations and voluntary associations actively petitioned the Government and
expressed their views in newspapers and pamphlets.... The dissent offers no evidence—none
whatever—that the First Amendment’s unqualified text was originally understood to exclude
such associational speech from its protection.”); id. at 929 (“The [First] Amendment is written
in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers. Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of
speaker, from single individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations
of individuals, to incorporated associations of individuals.”).
19. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). The Austin Court concluded that “the unique state-conferred
corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries,” threatened to distort the
political process. Id. at 660. 
20. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906-07.
21. Id. at 911.
22. Id. at 897. 
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in light of those “onerous” requirements, “a corporation may not be
able to establish a PAC in time to make its views known regarding
candidates and issues in a current campaign.”  Accordingly, the23
Court concluded that restrictions on corporate independent expend-
itures are restrictions on speech whose “purpose and effect are to
silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.”24
In other words, “[c]orporations and other associations, like individu-
als, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of
information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster,”25
and administrative burdens on their political speech are impermis-
sible. 
The Citizens United majority identified two First Amendment
interests impacted by BCRA’s independent expenditure provisions:
those of the corporate would-be speakers, and those of the public,
who might want to hear from “the voices that best represent the
most significant segments of the economy.”  Thus, Citizens United26
flatly rejected the possibility of distinguishing corporate speakers
from other speakers based on their particular social role as profit-
making enterprises for purposes of establishing the applicable level
of First Amendment protection.  In other words, despite the fact27
that corporations’ election-related speech must “aim ‘to enhance
the profitability of the company, no matter how persuasive the
arguments for a broader or conflicting set of priorities,’”  corporate28
speech is equally worthy of First Amendment protection as
speech by nonprofit advocacy groups. In fact, a profit motive could
result in unique and valuable insights that might be lost if cor-
porate speakers were excluded from election-related speech.29
23. Id. at 897-98.
24. Id. at 898.
25. Id. at 900 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8
(1986)). The Court further stated that it had previously “rejected the argument that political
speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’” Id.
26. Id. at 907 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257-58 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part)).
27. Id. (“By suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit,
the Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public.”).
28. Id. at 974 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29. Id. at 912 (majority opinion) (“On certain topics corporations may possess valuable
expertise, leaving them the best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts,
including the speech of candidates and elected officials.”); see also id. at 929 (Scalia, J.,
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Countervailing interests fell comparatively flat: the Court rejected
as compelling state interests the prevention of corruption or its
appearance,  the protection of “dissenting shareholders from being30
compelled to fund corporate political speech,”  and the need to avoid31
distortion of the political process or the potential for corporations to
amplify their message in the political marketplace based on their
winnings in the economic marketplace.  In other words, political32
speech that is motivated by some CEO’s belief that passage of
particular legislation or election of a certain candidate will benefit
the corporate bottom line is as valuable as political speech sparked
by any other motivation. 
With this holding, Citizens United reversed the course that the
Court had set in other campaign finance cases—particularly, for
purposes of this Article, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(MCFL).  MCFL distinguished corporations from pure advocacy33
organizations, holding that independent expenditure restrictions
like those at issue in Citizens United were unconstitutional as
applied to nonprofit advocacy organizations that did not accept
contributions from corporations or unions.  In so holding, the Court34
relied explicitly on MCFL’s purpose, which was to engage in political
advocacy.  As the Court stated, “MCFL was formed to disseminate35
political ideas, not to amass capital. The resources it has available
are not a function of its success in the economic marketplace, but its
popularity in the political marketplace.”  Thus, the MCFL Court36
endorsed the view that political speech by an organization whose
concurring) (“[T]o exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the
modern free economy. W e should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this speech
to the public debate.”).
30. Id. at 908-11 (majority opinion).
31. Id. at 911. The Court held both that this interest was not compelling and that BCRA
was both under- and over-inclusive, because, on the one hand, BCRA permitted general
treasury-funded electioneering communications outside of the thirty- or sixty-day windows;
and, on the other, BCRA applied to corporations with only one shareholder even though, in
those corporations, there was no dissenting contingent to protect. Id.
32. Id. at 904-07.
33. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
34. Id. at 263-64.
35. See, e.g., id. at 264 (stating that the fact that MCFL “was formed for the express
purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities” was crucial to
the Court’s holding). 
36. Id. at 259.
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mission is advocacy of a social or political issue is not only distin-
guishable from  corporate political speech but is also entitled to
more First Amendment protection. Citizens United, however, either
placed no significance on the organizational mission, or else con-
cluded that a profit-making motive was as important, from a First
Amendment perspective, as an “inherently political” motive. 
Thus, Citizens United rejected MCFL ’s conclusion that a speaker’s
purpose or motivation, including profit motive, could be determina-
tive of his or her First Amendment rights.  It also declined to weigh37
the probable effectiveness of the method of communication as part
of the First Amendment calculus. The next section will discuss how
these principles might apply to unions in and outside of the cam-
paign finance context.
II. CITIZENS UNITED AND LABOR UNIONS
Curiously, Citizens United hardly referred to unions at all, even
though the decision applies to unions,  and even though the major-38
ity opinion talked extensively about other types of associations—
such as news organizations and nonprofits, like the Sierra Club
—and the importance of their political speech to American democ-
37. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (“The First Amendment does not permit Congress
to make ... categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the
content of the political speech.”). In dissent, Justice Stevens noted some ambiguity in the
majority opinion as to whether the speaker’s motivation might still play some role in the First
Amendment calculus. See id. at 936 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). However, in light of the Court’s ringing endorsement of the value of corporate speech
to the political process and the Court’s persistent broad-brush treatm ent of corporations as
associations, it is hard to identify any such limiting principle in the majority opinion.
38. Id. at 886-87 (majority opinion) (stating that section 302 of BCRA applies to unions).
Though the majority opinion in Citizens United does not speak directly to whether unions are
encompassed in its holding, there is nothing in the opinion that suggests a basis upon which
unions might be excluded. Further, Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion states explicitly
that the majority opinion applies to both unions and corporations, id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (referring to corporations and unions), and neither the majority opinion nor the
other opinions dispute that statement. Moreover, within days of Citizens United ’s
announcem ent, the Federal Election Commission stated that it would no longer enforce the
independent expenditure provisions of BCRA against either corporations or unions. News
Release, FEC, FEC Statement on the Suprem e Court’s Decision in Citizens United v. FEC
(Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2010/20100205CitizensUnited.
shtml. Thus, even if it were theoretically possible that the Court meant to exclude unions from
Citizens United ’s holding, it certainly did not convey as much. 
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racy.  Against the backdrop of this wide-ranging opinion, the39
Court’s failure to discuss labor unions was particularly unusual
because the Austin Court had concluded that “crucial differences
between unions and corporations” meant that certain justifications
for restricting political speech by corporations did not apply to
unions. In particular, Austin focused on the fact that, unlike
corporations, “union members who disagree with a union's political
activities need not give up full membership in the organization to
avoid supporting its political activities.”  40
Yet, Citizens United has the potential to have both direct and
indirect effects on unions. By direct effects, I mean those that are a
direct consequence of the case’s holding that the “independent
expenditure” provisions of BCRA are unconstitutional. By indirect,
I mean those that are outgrowths of the Court’s articulation of
general First Amendment principles. This Article will discuss these
in turn.
A. Citizens United’s Direct Effects
Most obviously, Citizens United means that unions, like cor-
porations, will be free to spend money from their general treasuries
on independent advocacy for or against particular candidates.
Theoretically, this could mean that unions will be able to spend
more money on elections, with resulting increases in political clout.
But, as a practical matter, unions’ influence must be measured as
a function of corporations’ clout. Because corporations in the
aggregate have much more money to spend than do unions—and
because corporations’ collective political expenditures dwarf unions’
39. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896-97.
40. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665-66 (1990). 
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political expenditures —it is likely that Citizens United will only41
increase business interests’ comparative advantage over unions.
Even beyond sheer disparities in spending power, there exist
structural reasons that Citizens United will mean relatively little for
unions’ political influence. First, as to the PAC requirement itself,
although creating a PAC and complying with the rules that govern
its operation is surely taxing, many unions already have in place
both PACs themselves and mechanisms for complying with election
law.  Additionally, there is relatively little chance that an “upstart”42
union will not be able to “establish a PAC in time to make its views
known regarding candidates and issues in a current campaign.”43
Not only are there simply not very many upstart unions to begin
with, those that do exist generally affiliate with a venerable na-
tional or international union that is well accustomed to complying
with election law.  44
41. In the months after Citizens United was announced, unions dramatically outspent
corporations on independent campaign advertising. T.W . Farnam, Unions Spending Big on
Campaign Ads, W ASH. POST, July 7, 2010, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com /wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/06/AR2010070602133.htm l?sid=ST2010070605201
(discussing corporate and union spending between January and July 2010). However, that
trend reversed once midterm election campaigning began in earnest. The Center for
Responsive Politics reports that, whereas labor groups and related individuals spent about
$96 million on political campaigns in 2010, business groups and related individuals spent $1.3
billion. Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to Candidates and
Parties, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/blio.php (last
visited Sept. 25, 2011). In that regard, it is worth noting the recent disclosure of an e-mail
from one coal-industry executive to several others, stating that “a num ber of coal industry
representatives recently have been considering developing a 527 entity with the purpose of
attempting to defeat anti-coal incumbents in select races.” E-mail from Roger L. Nicholson,
Senior Vice President, Int’l Coal Corp., Inc. (July 27, 2010, 09:45 EST), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/site/page?id=11272702. The e-mail referenced Citizens United: “W ith
the recent Supreme Court ruling, we are in a position to be able to take corporate positions
that were not previously available in allowing our voices to be heard.” Id.
42. A search shows that 1607 active labor organizations reported to the Departm ent of
Labor that they had a PAC during Fiscal Year 2010. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Search,
http://kcerds.dol-esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do (select “Search Active Unions Only” and “PAC”;
then select “2010” in the “Fiscal Year” field; then follow “submit” hyperlink) (last visited Sept.
25, 2011). A total of 20,897 labor organizations filed reports for Fiscal Year 2010. Id. (select
“Search Active Unions Only”; then select “2010” in the “Fiscal Year” field; then follow “submit”
hyperlink). For a listing of PACs in the United States, see, for example, FEC, PACRONYMS
(2009), available at http://www.fec.gov/public/pacronyms/Pacronyms.pdf.
43. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
44. “Independent” unions filed only 818 union disclosure reports with the Department of
Labor for Fiscal Year 2010, suggesting that there are a maximum of 818 private-sector unions
in the country that are not affiliated with a parent union. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union
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Second, Citizens United created the possibility of using funds that
come from sources other than member dues.  However, unions are45
nonprofit organizations, and the majority of their income typically
comes from dues and fees rather than other sources, such as
investments and loans.  Thus, unions simply may not have avail-46
able to them significant untapped sources of income with which to
engage in political speech. 
Additionally, unions’ uses of dues and fees for political purposes
are encumbered even beyond BCRA’s independent expenditure
provision. For example, unions are not permitted to use for political
purposes dues and fees submitted by members who object to such
use,  and they must publicly disclose many of their expenditures47
and receipts pursuant to the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act.  This means that even if unions are excused from48
the segregation and reporting requirements that election law
imposes, they must nonetheless carefully track their spending and
ensure that only authorized funds go toward political activities.
Thus, unless Citizens United undermines these requirements as
Search, http://kcerds.dol-esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do (select “Search Independent Unions
Only”; “Search Active Unions Only”; then select “2010” in the “Fiscal Year” field; then follow
“submit” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). However, even that number is inflated
because some unions file multiple reports during the year. See, e.g., id. Moreover, some
unaffiliated unions—like the National Education Association—are themselves large,
venerable unions. See id. Thus, the number of small independent unions that may be unable
to comply with campaign finance law is much smaller than 818. 
45. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(ii) (2006).
46. For example, one of the largest local unions in the country, SEIU Local 32, reported
on its 2009 LM-2 that its cash receipts that year were about $74.7 million, of which $65.3
million came from dues. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Search, http://kcerds.dol.esa.gov/
query/getOrgQry.do (select “SEIU-SERVICE EMPLOYEES” in the “Union Name” field; select
“2009” in the “Fiscal Year” field; follow “Submit” hyperlink; select the box next to “SERVICE
EMPLOYEES NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS”; select the “Receipts Report”; then follow
“Submit” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). The union owned other assets, including
investments, but didn’t sell them off during the year. See id. For its part, the SEIU obtained
more than two-thirds of its 2009 receipts from a per-mem ber tax paid by local unions, with
most of the rest com ing from loans and rental income. See id. (select “SEIU-SERVICE
EMPLOYEES” in the “Union Name” field; select “2009” in the “Fiscal Year” field; follow
“Submit” hyperlink; select the box next to “SERVICE EMPLOYEES”; select the “Receipts
Report”; then follow “Submit” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
47. See infra Part II.A.2.a; see also Commc’n W orkers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762-63 (1988);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 431(b) (2006) (requiring unions to file financial reports containing
information about assets, liabilities, receipts, salaries, loans made, and other disbursements).
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well—a point to which I will return —Citizens United did not free49
unions from the need to segregate “political” funds from other funds,
nor from the need to comply with reporting requirements in order
to engage in political speech.
Finally, whatever the difficulty of complying with BCRA, the
availability of funds with which unions might engage in political
speech is substantially limited by the well-documented “representa-
tion gap” between the number of workers who are union members
and the number of workers who would like to belong to a union.50
Whatever the cause of the representation gap, its effect is that
unions will receive fewer dues with which to fund political advocacy
than they would if everyone who wanted to belong to a union did
belong. Further, if, as has been persuasively argued, the represen-
tation gap is largely attributable to employers’ abilities to defeat
unionization drives through coercive tactics such as retaliating
against pro-union workers and holding mandatory, closed-door
meetings with employees in order to disparage the union,  then it51
is all the more troubling: corporations will be able to enjoy a
“virtuous cycle,” in which they can defeat unionization drives with
increasing effectiveness, which will in turn leave unions weaker and
less able to oppose hostile legislative reform, judicial nominees, and
the like.52
49. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
50. Only about 12 percent of workers currently belong to a union. News Release, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2010 (Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/union2.pdf; see also Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor
Law , 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1528 (2002). However, in a 2005 survey, over half of workers
said that if an election were held today, they would vote for a union. Richard B. Freeman, Do
Workers Still Want Unions? More Than Ever (Econ. Policy Inst., Briefing Paper No. 182,
2007), available at http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bp182/bp182.pdf. Further, that number
had been steadily rising over at least the previous two decades. Id. When given a choice
between representation by a union and formation of a workplace committee comprised of
workers and management that would get together to discuss problems, a plurality of workers
still indicated they would choose a union, and a large majority of workers wanted one or the
other. See id. at 7. Thus, at least as of 2005, m ost workers wanted to belong to a union, and
a large majority wanted more voice on the job in some form.
51. See Estlund, supra note 50, at 1543-44; Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law
Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement,
22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 379-81 (2001) (citing literature showing the “causal role
of employer opposition in union election losses”).
52. The Citizens United majority was entirely unconcerned about the possibility that some
corporate voices might drown out others. Rather, it repeatedly invoked the metaphor of the
“marketplace of ideas,” which derives from Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
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Thus, it is doubtful that the freedom to spend general treasury
funds on independent political speech will ultimately make much
difference to unions. To the contrary, it may even prove to be a net
loss if it results in a relatively greater amplification of corporate
political speech. 
It is not surprising, then, that several unions have condemned
Citizens United, and that the SEIU has called for a constitutional
amendment to overturn Citizens United.  Of course, this opposition53
could have a variety of motivations: unions may believe, rightly or
wrongly, that Citizens United holds little meaningful promise for
them in light of corporations’ greater spending power; or they may
perceive greater benefit in aligning themselves with popular outrage
about Citizens United than in getting out from under BCRA; or they
may believe, implausibly, that they can get the best of both worlds
in the form of a constitutional amendment that limits corporate, but
not union, speech. In any event, it is evident that some labor unions
do not see a significant benefit in Citizens United, and considering
the probable effects of overturning of BCRA’s independent expendi-
ture provisions alone, it is difficult to conclude that they are wrong.
But, the Citizens United Court also articulated broad First
Amendment principles that will have application in areas of First
Amendment doctrine that are unrelated to campaign finance,
assuming the Court does not limit Citizens United to the campaign
finance context in a later case. Thus, the next section explores what
Citizens United means for other aspects of labor speech doctrine
and whether it might give labor unions an unexpected cause for
celebration.
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that “the best test of truth” of an idea is “the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”). Citizens United v. FEC, 130
S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010). Thus, the majority evidently views the possibility that some voices
m ight be drowned out by corporate or union election advocacy as a net positive, because, by
definition, an idea that fails to gain traction in the marketplace is a wrong idea. Of course, it
is hardly news that, particularly in national elections, large organizations, including PACs,
dominate the media, and small organizations and individuals are at a distinct disadvantage.
However, to the extent that unions are a significant counterweight to corporations, it would
be troubling if, as I predict, labor political expression is artificially limited by aspects of labor
law that prevent unions from growing commensurate with employees’ support.
53. E.g., Ari Berman, Citizens Unite Against ‘Citizens United,’ THE NATION (July 29,
2010), http://www.thenation.com/article/38032/citizens-unite-against-citizens-united.
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B. Citizens United’s Indirect Effects
When it comes to First Amendment protections, it has been well
documented that labor unions receive less protection than other
social movement groups, and their speech sometimes receives less
protection than even commercial speech.  This Section describes54
relevant portions of the Court’s pre-Citizens United labor speech
doctrine and discusses the extent to which it is undermined by
Citizens United. 
1. Labor Picketing and Boycotting, and the Waning Relevance of
Unions’ “Economic” Mission 
In the First Amendment context, the Court has distinguished
between labor, commercial, and political speech.  In so doing, the55
Court has focused on the form of the speech, the identity and
general “mission” of the speaker, and the speaker’s goal in making
the particular utterance.  However, as discussed above,  Citizens56 57
United largely jettisoned these considerations from the First
Amendment calculus, leaving only what this Article will call
“structural,” or categorical, aspects of speech as permissible bases
on which to assign degrees of First Amendment protection. Thus, in
Citizens United, once the Court identified the speech at issue as
falling into the category of election-related speech—something
that was not difficult to do in light of its focus on a presidential
candidate—the conclusion followed nearly automatically that the
speech was entitled to the same full First Amendment protection as
any other speech falling into that category, regardless of whether
Citizens United was a corporation or whether its goal was to benefit
financially by helping to elect a candidate who would enact favor-
able economic policies. 
54. See, e.g., James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two
Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 191 (1984) (“On the ladder of First
Am endment values, political speech occupies the top rung, commercial speech rests on the
rung below, and labor speech is relegated to a ‘black hole’ beneath the ladder.”).
55. See generally id. (discussing these distinctions).
56. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
762-65 (1976).
57. See supra Part I.
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This section traces the development of the Court’s First
Amendment doctrine as it pertains to labor picketing, boycotting,
and striking, and then discusses the potential impact thereon of
Citizens United.
a. Labor Picketing
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),  as amended by the58
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),  contains a number of59
prohibitions on picketing by labor unions. First, section 8(b)(1)(A),
as interpreted by NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local
Union No. 639,  prohibits picketing that involves “violence, intim-60
idation, and reprisal or threats thereof ”  in the service of coercing61
employees to join or refrain from joining a union.  Additionally, and62
more importantly for purposes of this Article, the NLRA bans
even peaceful picketing under a number of circumstances. Section
8(b)(4)(i) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to picket in
order to “induce or encourage” employees to strike or boycott if the
union has one or more of four impermissible goals: (1) to “forc[e] or
requir[e]” an employer or self-employed person to join a union or to
agree to boycott another employer; (2) to “forc[e] or requir[e]” anyone
to stop “using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing”
with the products of another employer, or to force an employer to
bargain with the union even though the union is not the certified
representative of the relevant employees; (3) to “forc[e] or requir[e]”
any employer to bargain with a union when another union is
already the certified representative of the relevant employees; or (4)
to “forc[e] or requir[e]” any employer to assign work to members of
one union over another.  Further, under section 8(b)(7), it is an63
unfair labor practice for a union to picket, or threaten to picket,
when the goal of the picketing is to “forc[e] or requir[e]” the
employer to recognize or bargain with a union that has not been
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006).
59. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 80 Pub. L. No. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 167, 171-83, 185-87 (2006)). 
60. 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
61. Id. at 290. 
62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A).
63. Id. § 158(b)(4)(i)(A)-(D).
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certified as the bargaining representative of the relevant employees
and when one of the following is true: (1) another union has been
properly recognized as the relevant employees’ bargaining represen-
tative; (2) an NLRB election has taken place within the preceding
year; or (3) the picketing has been going on for more than thirty
days without the union having filed for an NLRB election.  Finally,64
in addition to these statutory prohibitions, the Court has upheld the
right of states to enjoin picketing expressing a viewpoint that is
contrary to state policy.65
First Amendment challenges to these restrictions on labor pick-
eting have often failed based on the rationale that picketing is at
least partly coercive conduct, which the First Amendment does not
protect. In some of these cases, violent conduct served to justify
regulating the speech aspects of picketing. The Court held that
when picketing was accompanied by “violence on a considerable
scale”  and “enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct,”66 67
it could not be separated from the violence for First Amendment
purposes. Instead, it was to be treated as part of a single course of
conduct that had the potential to coerce listeners, not through
speech, but through physical harm or the threat thereof.  68
However, the Court has also held that even nonviolent labor
picketing can be “coercive,” because “the very presence of a picket
line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of
the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.”  In this69
view, picketing itself—walking back and forth while holding
signs—seems to be the “conduct” justifying limitations on union
advocacy.  70
64. Id. § 158(b)(7).
65. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 466 (1950) (holding that the state could ban
“industrial” picketing that subverts its “policy against involuntary employment on racial
lines”).
66. Milk W agon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 291,
298-99 (1941) (holding that the power to limit picketing comes from  the power to limit
coercion and that when picketing has previously involved substantial violence, future
picketing can also be enjoined); see also Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council,
257 U.S. 184, 205 (1921) (holding that the Clayton Act’s labor exemption was not applicable
to strikes and picketing that involved violence).
67. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. at 292.
68. Id. at 294. 
69. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957).
70. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & W arehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S.
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The Court has set forth multiple accounts of how even nonviolent
picketing can “induce” action by either individuals viewing the
picket line or the target of the picket line. First, it has suggested
that picketing may intimidate onlookers such that they will be
unwilling to cross the picket line, regardless of their sympathies—or
lack thereof—for the picketers’ cause.  Second, at least one member71
of the Court has theorized that union members may simply comply
with any labor picket line they see out of reflexive loyalty to the
union movement.  Finally, the Court has reasoned that labor72
picketing can be limited consistent with the First Amendment
because, regardless of the reasons that customers or suppliers honor
a picket line, a successful picket line can damage its target eco-
nomically, thereby compelling the target to cede to the union’s
demands.73
Based on its conclusion that labor picketing involves an element
of coercive conduct, the Court has held that it can be restricted
when it has an impermissible goal, regardless of how likely the
picketing is to accomplish that goal. Examples of impermissible
goals include seeking to compel an employer to violate law  or state74
and federal policies.  The Court has also upheld the NLRA’s pro-75
hibitions on picketing as justified by Congress’s desire to promote
labor peace and economic stability.  76
58, 77 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that picketing “includes at least two concepts:
(1) patrolling, that is, standing or marching back and forth or round and round on the street,
sidewalks, private property, or elsewhere, generally adjacent to someone else’s premises; (2)
speech, that is, arguments, usually on a placard, made to persuade other people to take the
picketers’ side of a controversy” (citations omitted)). 
71. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 327-28 (1921); cf. Bakery & Pastry Drivers &
Helpers Local 803 v. W ohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942) (implying that picketing could be deemed
improper when it caused customers to “turn away”).
72. NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result) (explaining that picketing is a
unique form of communication because it “calls for an automatic response to a signal, rather
than a reasoned response to an idea”). 
73. Vogt, 354 U.S. at 292.
74. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 504 (1949) (upholding an
injunction against picketing that sought to encourage an employer to boycott another
company, in violation of antitrust law).
75. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 466 (1950).
76. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 611 (plurality opinion) (stating that NLRA policy was to protect
secondary parties from becom ing embroiled in labor disputes, and that picketing that
threatened secondary parties could be restricted); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 309 v. Hanke,
339 U.S. 470, 477-79 (1950) (holding that a state could enjoin peaceful picketing based on the
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Curiously, limits on unions’ rights to picket have endured as
courts have expanded the First Amendment protection afforded to
others who engage in picketing, even when that picketing is
accompanied by violence  or conducted in pursuit of illegal or con-77
trary-to-policy goals.  For example, eight members of the Supreme78
Court agreed that the First Amendment shielded members of the
Westboro Baptist Church from tort liability arising out of its highly
offensive picketing at the funerals of armed services members.  The79
Court concluded that even though Westboro’s “contribution to public
discourse may be negligible,” the First Amendment nonetheless
trumped tort liability because “Westboro addressed matters of pub-
lic import on public property, in a peaceful manner.”  Interestingly,80
the Phelps Court listed “a few limited situations where the location
of targeted picketing can be regulated under provisions that the
Court has determined to be content neutral,” but did not enumerate
restrictions on secondary labor picketing among them.  As it seems81
unlikely that the Court did not think of labor picketing, this
omission may have been a tacit recognition that the Court’s labor
picketing doctrine is simply in a class of its own. 
The Court’s most recent explanation for its different treatment of
unions, as compared to other types of groups (such as the Westboro
Church), rests on its perception that union picketing is essentially
economic. Thus, the Court has distinguished labor picketing from
“public-issue picketing,” calling the latter “an exercise of ... basic
constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form,”  while82
determination that picketing would undermine small businesses by subjecting them to
“dictation as to business policy”).
77. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 926 (1982) (holding that civil rights
picketing and other conduct is protected by First Amendment, even though scattered incidents
of violence had taken place); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (holding that
white supremacist speech is protected unless violence is “imminent”). 
78. For example, the Supreme Court has held that limitations on the conduct of protestors
at abortion clinics must be narrowly tailored, even though the state has a strong interest in
protecting its citizens’ freedom  from unwanted speech while seeking medical care. Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715, 728 (2000).
79. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, J.J.; Breyer, J., filed a separate concurring
opinion).
80. Id. at 1220.
81. Id. at 1218 (listing picketing in front of a residence and at abortion clinics).
82. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1980) (rejecting an Illinois state statute that
permitted labor picketing more broadly than other picketing and distinguishing between labor
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labeling the former “speech of an entirely private and economic
character.”  Likewise, the Court has reasoned that certain picket-83
ing that could be restricted in the labor context nonetheless could
not be restricted in other contexts, because “[w]hile States have
broad power to regulate economic activity, we do not find a compara-
ble right to prohibit peaceful political activity.”84
More recently, the Court backed off the position that all union
speech is inherently “economic,” rather than “public issue.” In
DeBartolo v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council,  the NLRB ordered a union to stop distributing handbills85
asking consumers not to patronize a shopping mall because of a
dispute with a contractor that had been hired to work on the mall.86
Notably, the handbills were phrased in terms of the impact of the
labor dispute on the larger community, stating, for example, that
substandard wages would diminish workers’ buying ability and
threaten the prevailing wage standard in the entire community.87
The Court held, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, that the
NLRA should not be construed to forbid this handbilling.  But the88
Court neither “suggest[ed] that communications by labor unions are
never of the commercial speech variety,” nor did it even determine
conclusively that the handbilling at issue was not commercial.89
Thus, even as the Court seemed to be on the verge of stating
outright that political speech by unions was entitled to the same
degree of constitutional protection as other political speech, it
picketing from “public-issue picketing ... on issues of broader social concern”).
83. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763 n.17
(1976); see also Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989) (commercial speech receives
less First Amendment protection than political speech).
84. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912-13 (1982). Secondary boycotts
involve attempts to coerce neutral employers to get involved in labor disputes by threatening
a strike or consumer boycott.
85. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
86. Id. at 573. The NLRB concluded that the union’s conduct violated the NLRA’s
prohibition on secondary boycott activity. Id.
87. Id. at 570 n.1.
88. Id. at 575-76.
89. Id. at 576. Though the DeBartolo  Court referred to the possibility that union speech
was commercial speech, the Court has never applied its commercial speech doctrine to labor
unions—rather, as described in this and the following section, the Court has applied a test
that is less stringent than the commercial speech test to restrictions on labor picketing and
boycotting. 
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backed off, allowing for the possibility that the union’s speech might
still be primarily economic in nature. 
In sum, although the Court has long recognized that peaceful
picketing that communicates the facts of a labor dispute is expres-
sion to which the First Amendment applies,  it has also limited the90
scope of applicable First Amendment protection when picketers are
unions or union members. These cases initially reasoned that pick-
eting could be regulated because it constituted “conduct” rather
than “speech.”  More recently, though, the Court has expanded91
protection for “coercive” picketing in nonlabor contexts. The Court
has relied on unions’ “economic” motive for picketing, regardless of
the expressive content, to contrast union picketing from what the
Court has characterized as true political or public-interest picketing. 
b. Strikes and Boycotts
The NLRA prohibits not only secondary picketing  but also92
secondary strikes or boycotts—those designed to force a neutral
employer to become involved in pressuring an employer with which
the union has a primary dispute.  It also prohibits most “hot cargo”93
agreements—agreements that a secondary employer will not handle
the goods or services of a primary employer—as well as requests
from one union to another to go on strike or refuse to handle goods
in order to put pressure on a primary employer.  94
As with picketing, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of
the NLRA’s prohibition of secondary boycotts and strikes,  even as95
it has held that other entities’ secondary boycotts are protected by
90. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940) (overturning a loitering conviction
for labor picketing based on the First Amendment); Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301
U.S. 468, 478 (1937) (observing that union members may “make known the facts of a labor
dispute” because “freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution”).
91. E.g., Milk W agon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 294 (1941).
92. Secondary picketing is aimed at forcing or requiring anyone to stop “using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing” with the products of another employer. NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (2006).
93. Id. As discussed above, the Court held in DeBartolo  that this section only applies to
calls for secondary consumer boycotts that are accomplished by means of picketing. Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 573
(1988); supra note 85 and accompanying text.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i), (ii).
95. See, e.g., Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225-27 (1982).
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the First Amendment.  Again, the Court has distinguished the two96
based on its perception of unions as primarily economic actors
—even when the secondary strike itself is not motivated by any
economic concern.  Addressing such a political secondary strike,97
which was called to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,  the98
Court held that the union’s conduct was punishable under the
NLRA notwithstanding its arguments for First Amendment pro-
tection. Recognizing the political character of the strike, the Court
concluded it was “more rather than less objectionable”  because it99
was called “in aid of a random political objective far removed from
what has traditionally been thought to be the realm of legitimate
union activity.”  Moreover, the Court’s conception that the appro-100
priate scope of a union’s role did not include “random political
objective[s]”  was apparently crucial to its holding. The Court held101
that the First Amendment protected a coercive secondary boycott
launched in pursuit of a social justice objective just one year later,
in Claiborne Hardware.  102
The Court has also relied on the presence of an “economic” pur-
pose outside of the NLRA context, to distinguish protected speech
from antitrust violations. In Federal Trade Commission v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n (SCTLA), the Court considered an
antitrust action against a group of lawyers who accepted appoint-
ments from the District of Columbia Superior Court to represent
indigent criminal defendants.  The District of Columbia govern-103
ment set their compensation, which had remained at $20 per hour
for out-of-court time and $30 per hour for in-court time since
1970.  By the early 1980s, even the D.C. government was sympa-104
thetic to the lawyers’ calls for pay increases but unable to grant an
96. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912-13 (1982).
97. Allied Int’l, 456 U.S. at 222-23.
98. Id. The Court accepted that the union would not benefit economically from the strike.
Id.
99. Id. at 225 (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 225-26 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 226.
102. 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (stating, regarding secondary boycott, that “[s]peech does not
lose its protected character, however, simply because it may ... coerce [listeners] into action”).
Further, Claiborne Hardware cited Allied International with approval, so it presumably did
not overrule that case. Id. at 912.
103. 493 U.S. 411, 414 (1990).
104. Id. at 415.
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increase for political reasons.  In response, the lawyers formed a105
“strike committee,” and resolved not to accept any new appoint-
ments until their hourly rate was raised—a resolution that about 90
percent of the lawyers who regularly accepted cases kept.  They106
also circulated a petition explaining that they would not accept
cases until the government raised their hourly rate.  Their activ-107
ities received significant media coverage.  108
Ultimately, the lawyers successfully convinced D.C.’s mayor and
City Council to grant a raise, and the lawyers went back to work.109
However, the Federal Trade Commission saw the lawyers’ conduct
not as protected protest activity but instead as “a conspiracy to fix
prices and to conduct a boycott” in violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.  In their defense, the lawyers110
argued that their “boycott was adequately justified by the public
interest in obtaining better legal representation” and that it was
protected by the First Amendment, either because the lawyers were
petitioning the government or because their boycott was political
action to which Claiborne Hardware’s principles applied.111
That defense was unsuccessful. Like the labor boycotts that the
Court discussed in Claiborne Hardware and Allied International,112
the Court saw the lawyers’ goals as economic —even though the113
Court “assume[d] that the preboycott rates were unreasonably low,
that the increase ha[d] produced better legal representation for
indigent defendants” and that the boycott was necessary to raise the
reimbursement rate, “given that neither indigent criminal defen-
dants nor the lawyers who represent them command any special
appeal with the electorate.”  Nonetheless, the Court held that the114
“social justifications proffered for respondents’ restraint of trade ...
105. Id. at 416.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 418.
110. Id. at 418-19 (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 419 (citing E. R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)).
Noerr held, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, that the Sherman Act did not prohibit
lobbying, even when the lobbyists’ goals were anticompetitive. 365 U.S. at 136.
112. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
113. SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 423.
114. Id. at 421.
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do not make it any less unlawful.”  Importantly, the reason was115
that “the undenied objective of [the lawyers’] boycott was an eco-
nomic advantage for those who agreed to participate.”  Thus,116
regardless of the content of the lawyers’ speech, its motivation was
its undoing. In fact, beyond concluding that it constituted a boycott
and a horizontal price-fixing arrangement,  the SCTLA majority117
did not pay much attention to the content of the lawyers’ speech.
Instead, the Court concluded that any “expressive component” was
essentially irrelevant because “[e]very concerted refusal to do busi-
ness with a potential customer or supplier has an expressive
component.”  118
The following principles can be discerned from the Court’s cases
on picketing and boycotting: First, labor speech can be restricted if
it has the potential to coerce, provided its viewpoint conflicts with
law or state policy. In contrast, advocacy by other individuals or
groups is often protected under the First Amendment even if it is
actually coercive. Second, the Court views the appropriate role of
unions as encompassing only economic advocacy on behalf of their
membership; virtually any other goal could fail the “contrary to
policy” test. 
c. Citizens United: Replacing Motive and Identity with 
Category and Structure
As described above, the Court has repeatedly held that unions’
and workers’ “economic” goals mean that their speech is entitled to
less First Amendment protection than tactically similar—but, in the
Court’s view, politically motivated—speech. In contrast, the Citizens
United Court held that the fact that the goal of corporate political
speech was profit did not detract from its level of First Amendment
115. Id. at 424. 
116. Id. at 426. Justice Stevens, who also drafted the opinion in Claiborne Hardware, 458
U.S. 880 (1982), rejected the lawyers’ attem pt to draw an analogy to that case: “[The
Claiborne Hardware defendants] sought no special advantage for themselves.... They sought
only the equal respect and equal treatment to which they were constitutionally entitled....
Equality and freedom are preconditions of the free market, and not commodities to be haggled
over within it.” SCTLA , 493 U.S. at 426-27.
117. SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 436 n.19.
118. Id. at 431. 
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protection.  Further, the Court was adamant that neither the fact119
that a speaker is a corporation nor the fact that non-MCFL cor-
porations are profit-driven operations was a sufficient basis upon
which to burden corporate political speech.  Given all this, if120
nothing except economic motivation distinguishes labor expression
from other groups’ expression, then surely it would violate Citizens
United to continue to treat them differently
If this is true, and if the SCTLA majority was correct that every
antitrust violation is expressive,  then antitrust law may also be121
in some trouble. On the other hand, if labor speech, commercial
speech, and public issue/political speech can actually be categorized
based on structural or other factors—for example, the audience at
which the expression is aimed—then it might be reasonable to
continue treating those categories of speech differently. 
Indeed, there appear to be some viable ways to distinguish
commercial speech from political speech, even post-Citizens United.
For example, in the Court’s initial articulation of the commercial
speech doctrine, it focused on the content of the speech, observing
that there were “commonsense differences between speech that does
‘no more than propose a commercial transaction’ ... and other
varieties.”  At minimum, then, speech that advertises the prices of122
goods or offers to buy or sell an item can be placed in the “commer-
cial speech” category.  On the other end of the spectrum, the Court123
119. Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
120. Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
121. SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 431.
122. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976) (citation omitted).
123. Some commentators predict the total collapse of the distinction between commercial
and political speech in the wake of Citizens United. E.g., Tamara R. Piety, Commentary,
Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS
16 (2010), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/piety.pdf. Although I think that
distinction between commercial and public issue/political speech will remain viable as
discussed in this section, I agree that it will become easier for corporations to avoid having
their speech characterized as “commercial” by courts. This is because once a speaker’s
motivation falls away from the analysis, speakers can readily shape nearly any message into
a “political” message. Thus, one can easily imagine even a message about the price of
pharmaceutical drugs rendered political when clothed in a message about community welfare.
For example, W almart’s advertisements for its four-dollar prescriptions, which feature
consumer testimonials, discuss the impact of prescription drug prices on Medicare recipients,
the state of the economy generally, and the need for affordable health care in this country.
Affordable Prescription Program Testimonials, W ALMART, http://replay.web.archive.org/
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has previously stated that discussion of either constitutional  or124
statutory  rights are entitled to special protection. If that principle125
is still correct, then the SCTLA’s speech about the importance of
indigent criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel
would be protected to the same extent as any other speech falling
into that category, regardless of underlying motive.
Furthermore, closer inspection reveals other ways of distin-
guishing commercial from political speech. For example, in his
partial dissent in SCTLA,  Justice Brennan rejected the majority’s126
motivation-based conclusion: “the different purposes of the speech
can hardly render the Trial Lawyers’ boycott any less expressive.”127
Instead, he argued that the content of the lawyers’ activity could be
meaningfully distinguished from the run-of-the-mill antitrust
violation, proposing that “[w]hen a boycott seeks to generate public
support for the passage of legislation, it may operate on a political
rather than economic level, especially when the government is the
target.”  In contrast, he noted, “a typical boycott functions by128
transforming its participants into a single monopolistic entity that
restricts supply and increases price.”  Thus, Justice Brennan129
identified three aspects of the SCTLA lawyers’ boycott that—
independent of their motivation—placed their expression in the
public issue/political expression category and not the commercial/
20100102045459/http://walmartstores.com/healthwellness/8457.aspx (accessed by searching
for Walmart in the Internet Archive index) (featuring consumer testimonials stating that
W almart’s program “especially impacts older customers who are on Medicare”; that, before
finding Walmart, a consumer “found [her]self on unemployment and could not afford [her]
medication”; and thanking W almart for “doing for our great American Country—what our
government, congress and legislators could not do [sic]”). Once motivation becomes irrelevant,
it is difficult to distinguish much of that speech from advocacy for or against healthcare
reform. Similarly, the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court observed that there were few
commercial messages to which a “public interest element ... could not be added,” because a
pharmacist “could cast himself as a commentator on store-to-store disparities.” 425 U.S. at
764-65. 
124. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 914-15 (1982).
125. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 499, 513 (1939) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the right of citizens to gather to discuss federal legislation).
126. Justice Brennan also concurred in part, agreeing that the lawyers’ conduct was
“neither clearly outside the scope of the Sherman Act nor automatically immunized from
antitrust regulation by the First Amendment.” SCTLA, 493 U.S. at 437 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. Id. at 449.
128. Id. at 441.
129. Id. at 442.
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economic category: its public nature; that it was aimed at achieving
legislative change; and that the government was the target.  In130
addition, Justice Brennan emphasized that the boycott was really
a strike, which meant that, in order to communicate the strength of
their message, the lawyers had to give up their own income, which
was surely a hardship.  131
Although the factors on Justice Brennan’s nonexhaustive list may
be neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis to distinguish between
different categories of speech without resort to considering motiva-
tion, they are a useful starting point. For example, speech that
seeks to address the public is more likely to be about a matter of
public concern, and thereby occupy a privileged place in the First
Amendment hierarchy, than speech that addresses only a single
private party.  In that regard, whether the speech receives mean-132
ingful media attention may also be relevant.  For example, the133
statement “raise (or lower) your prices by 15 percent, or we’ll take
our business elsewhere” is unlikely to garner much news coverage
absent some social or political content that might persuade the
public to take a stand on the cause. Thus, when Walmart threatens
to change suppliers unless a particular factory lowers its prices, it
may be a talking point for Walmart opponents, but it is not
generally something that Walmart itself seeks to publicize.134
Additionally, Citizens United stressed the First Amendment inter-
ests of listeners in being able to receive information,  which is far135
more relevant when a message is being aimed at the general public
130. Id. at 441-43.
131. Id. at 450. 
132. E.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983).
133. Of course, some actors will avoid publicity because they believe their expression to be
illegal, or fail to avoid publicity because they believe their expression to be legal. To the extent
the actor’s behavior depends on its perception of the law, rather than whether it needs public
support in order to improve its chances of succeeding at accomplishing its goals, that behavior
would likely be irrelevant to the First Amendment analysis. 
134. For example, a United Food and Commercial Workers’ Local Union states on its
website that W almart “pressures its extensive network of vendors to cut labor costs and lower
prices every year.” The Walmart Threat, UFCW  LOCAL 152, http://www.ufcwlocal152.
org/walmart_action.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). Unsurprisingly, I have been unable to
identify any similar statement on W almart’s own corporate website.
135. E.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010) (“W hen Government seeks to
use its full power, including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her
information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control
thought.”). 
30 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:001
to either accept or reject, than when it is in the nature of a threat
being aimed, in relative secrecy, at a single recipient. 
Applying these categories, much labor speech will fall into the
political/public issue category, rather than the commercial speech
category or some sort of separate “labor” category. Much labor
speech is inherently political, as the Court has occasionally rec-
ognized. In Thornhill v. Alabama,  a 1940 case, the Court stated136
that the “health of the present generation and of those as yet
unborn may depend on [wage and hour issues].... [L]abor relations
are not matters of mere local or private concern.”  More recently,137
DeBartolo recognized that wage levels could, at least sometimes, be
a community concern.  Likewise, in cases about the extent to138
which employees can be required to pay union dues or fees, the
Court has described a panoply of reasons that employees might have
political or ideological objections to belonging to a union.  Given139
that assessment of the political nature of some employees’ objections
to belonging to a union or to a union’s conduct—a correct assess-
ment, in my view—it is difficult to see how the union’s expression
itself can be regarded as apolitical. 
Even if one rejects the view that speech about working conditions
is inherently political in favor of the view that labor speech is
tantamount to commercial speech about the cost of human work,140
much labor speech arising outside the bargaining context will still
qualify as political. Thus, the DeBartolo Court’s recognition that
136. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
137. Id. at 103; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 762-63 (1976) (noting Thornhill’s language, and rejecting the idea of drawing a
distinction between addressing “the m erits of unionism in general” and addressing an
“immediate dispute” at a single plant).
138. See supra text accompanying note 87.
139. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) (“[An employee’s] moral or
religious views about the desirability of abortion may not square with the union’s policy in
negotiating a medical benefits plan. One individual might disagree with a union policy of
negotiating limits on the right to strike, believing that to be the road to serfdom  for the
working class, whereas another might have economic or political objections to unionism itself.
An employee might object to the union’s wage policy because it violates guidelines designed
to limit inflation, or might object to the union’s seeking a clause in the collective-bargaining
agreement proscribing racial discrimination. These examples could be multiplied.”).
140. Cf. James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law
of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1554-56 (2010) (describing how bargaining
over wages and working conditions differs fundamentally from bargaining in other business
contexts).
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speech about the benefits of unionism to the community was not
“typical commercial speech.”  And, it is likely that labor speech will141
increasingly fall into the category. Indeed, in order to win commu-
nity support, labor union campaigns often link their goals to other
social issues, like the prevailing community wage, environmental
health and safety, and dignitary concerns.  If the courts can no142
longer focus on the fact that the speakers in those instances are
labor unions, then it is difficult to see how they could continue to
maintain First Amendment distinctions between their expression
and that of other groups.
This new opportunity for the expansion of First Amendment
protection for labor speech has the potential to impact the labor
movement beyond simply opening up new avenues for picketing and
secondary activity. First, erasing the distinction between labor
unions and other social movement groups should free labor unions
to work more often and more closely with other types of groups to
pursue their joint goals, including through secondary boycotts and
picketing, without the risk that different sets of First Amendment
principles will be applied to labor and nonlabor groups in the same
coalition.  Second, Citizens United could create the opportunity for143
groups not covered by the NLRA or another labor statute, like the
SCTLA lawyers, to act collectively—a development that is of par-
ticular importance in light of employers’ increasing classification of
workers as “independent contractors.”  Third, it should render144
141. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 576 (1988). Of course, topics other than politics are entitled to “full First
Amendment protection,” including “expression about philosophical[,] social, artistic, economic,
literary, or ethical matters.” Abood, 431 U.S. at 231.
142. See James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law,
the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 901-04 (1991) (describing
alliances between unions and other types of advocacy groups).
143. For a detailed description of how existing labor law differs from First Amendment
principles that apply to other social movements and how these two might interact in the
context of joint union-social movement advocacy, see id. at 919-31.
144. Many of these workers are likely to be misclassified and in fact should be deemed
employees. See Myra H. Barron, Who’s an Independent Contractor? Who’s an Employee?, 14
LAB. LAW. 457, 457-58 (1999) (explaining the phenomenon, and consequences, of misclas-
sifying employees as independent contractors); Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t
Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 295, 297-98 (2001) (noting that, although employers often “crave the control they
enjoy in a normal em ployment relationship,” the advantages of labeling workers as
independent contractors “motivate a good deal of arbitrary and questionable ‘non-employee’
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irrelevant the continuing uncertainty over what constitutes labor
picketing by erasing the distinction between picketing and other
types of speech.145
2. Workers Who Object to Union Membership
a. Labor Law’s Approach to “Objectors”
In addition to undermining the bases upon which the Court has
limited what labor unions can say, and how they can say it, Citizens
United also calls into question the Court’s approach to how unions
can fund their political and organizing speech. This Section traces
briefly the development of the Court’s doctrine relating to union
dues and fees paid by “objecting” workers—those who are part of a
bargaining unit that is represented by a union but who do not want
to join the union—before discussing how Citizens United might
impact that approach.
The rules regulating the relationship between unions and
“objectors” have been refined and expanded over the course of the
last several decades. Generally, labor law allows a union chosen by
the majority of employees within a particular bargaining unit to
become the exclusive bargaining representative of all of the
employees in that bargaining unit.  Ideally, then, once a labor146
union is elected, the members of the bargaining unit will join the
union as active and involved dues-paying members, each of whom
classification”); Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective
Bargaining Rights for “Dependent Contractors,” 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 149
(2005) (arguing that employees are routinely misclassified as independent contractors).
However, whether they are misclassified, workers labeled “independent contractors” are
unlikely to act collectively and risk ending up in the same position as the SCTLA. 
145. See generally Timothy F. Ryan & Kathryn M. Davis, Banners, Rats, and Other
Inflatable Toys: Do They Constitute Picket Activity? Do They Violate Section 8(B)(4)?, 20 LAB.
LAW. 137 (2004) (examining the NLRB’s and the courts’ shifting policy as to what constitutes
protected labor speech). Despite the fact that the NLRA’s ban of picketing for certain purposes
has been on the books for several decades now, whether particular activity constitutes
picketing is still a matter of significant debate. See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners
of Am. Local Union No. 1506, 355 N .L.R.B. No. 159 (Aug. 27, 2010) (concluding, over a two-
member dissent, that large stationary banners did not constitute picketing or its equivalent).
146. Both the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act, as well as many state labor statutes,
create exclusive representation systems. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006); 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth,
Ninth, Eleventh (2006).
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the union will represent to the best of its ability. However, some
employees may not want union representation, preferring to bargain
with the employer individually. Among other reasons for this
preference, they may object to union membership on principle or to
the payment of dues. 
Initially, it was left to unions and employers to bargain over how
to treat employees who objected to union membership. For example,
under the NLRA, employers were statutorily forbidden from
discriminating against union members,  but unions and employers147
were free—though not required—to impose the closed or union
shop,  to permit members of a bargaining unit to refrain from148
joining the union, or to come to some other arrangement. 
Then, in 1947, Congress amended the NLRA to forbid the closed
shop,  but left the statute silent on the union shop, so that149
employers and unions were free to agree to such an arrangement.150
However, some states passed “right-to-work” laws, which outlawed
the union shop by forbidding employers from firing workers who
refused to join a union or pay union dues.  In 1949, the Supreme151
Court upheld the validity of such laws in the NLRA context,
rejecting unions’ argument that the laws infringed their First
Amendment rights of speech, assembly, and petition.  Specifically,152
the unions argued that the law prevented unions and employers
from agreeing that “no non-union members [could] work along with
147. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (stating that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate “in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That
nothing in this [Act] ... shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership therein, ... if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees”).
148. A “closed shop” system requires new hires to be union m em bers before they begin
work, whereas a “union shop” system requires new hires to become union members within a
short period of time after being hired. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreement
Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court’s
Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51, 57-58 (1990) (defining closed shop and union shop). 
149. The “closed shop” system was prohibited by the LMRA, which amended Section 8(3)
of the NLRA to permit, “as a condition of employment,” unions and employers to require
“membership [in a union] on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
150. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 148, at 57-59.
151. See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 527-28
(1949).
152. Id. at 530-31.
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union members,” an agreement the unions claimed was essential
to their ability to meaningfully exercise their right of self-organiza-
tion.  Additionally, the unions argued that, whereas there was a153
constitutionally protected right to join a union, there was no equiv-
alent constitutional right to work at a particular job without joining
the union.  The Court f latly rejected this argument, apparently154
finding it so ridiculous as to render its conclusion self-evident: “We
deem it unnecessary to elaborate the numerous reasons for our
rejection of [the First Amendment argument].”  The Court added155
that “where conduct affects the interests of other individuals and
the general public, the legality of that conduct must be measured by
whether the conduct conforms to valid law.”  Thus, the Court156
apparently rejected the union’s First Amendment argument on the
basis that making an agreement to operate as a closed or union shop
was conduct, not speech. 
The Court has not revisited this conclusion in recent years, and
many more states have adopted right-to-work laws—at present,
there are twenty-two such states.  But, these laws do not apply to157
employees and unions covered by the Railway Labor Act, which
explicitly permits “union shop” arrangements between carriers and
employees who fall under that statute, even in states with right-to-
work laws.  In Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson,  the158 159
Court rejected the argument that, on their face, union shop
agreements violated the First Amendment rights of employees who
were forced to join unions.  Interestingly, though, the Hanson160
Court also concluded that the First Amendment was implicated,
even though the agreements at issue were between private employ-
ers and unions.  The Court reasoned that the RLA had overridden161
153. Id. at 530 (explaining the union’s argument that closed or union shops were
“indispensable to the right of self organization and the association of workers into unions”
(citation omitted)).
154. Id. at 531.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Nat’l Right to Work Legal Comm., Right to Work States, NAT’L RIGHT TO W ORK
LEGAL DEF. FOUND., http://www.nrtw.org/en/rtws.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (showing
a map of right-to-work states). 
158. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (2006). 
159. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
160. Id. at 236-37.
161. Id. at 232 (“[I]f private rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement made
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state right-to-work laws, so even private union shop agreements
could be made only “by force of an agreement made pursuant to
federal law which expressly declares that state law is superseded....
In other words, the federal statute is the source of the power and
authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.”  Thus,162
at least in right-to-work states, it was only by dint of the federal
government’s power that union shop agreements were permissible,
and that exercise of power was enough to trigger First Amendment
rights for affected employees. Years later, and without discussion,
the Court expanded this principle to non-right-to-work states: “The
First Amendment does limit the uses to which the union can put
funds obtained from dissenting employees.... [B]y allowing the union
shop at all, we have already countenanced a significant impinge-
ment on First Amendment rights.”  163
Following Lincoln Federal, the Court decided a series of cases
regarding the scope of objectors’ rights in non-right-to-work states.
First, in International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street,  a group of164
railway employees sought a determination that the union’s cam-
paign contributions, funded by dues paid as a condition of continued
employment, violated dissenting members’ First Amendment
rights.  The Court found no facial First Amendment violation but165
construed the RLA to permit union shops only if members were not
required to fund political causes with which they disagreed.  But,166
the Street Court also recognized that the union had potential First
Amendment interests at stake, which had to be balanced against
employees’ rights: 
Whatever may be the powers of Congress or the States to forbid
unions altogether to make various types of political expenditures
... many of the expenditures involved in the present case are
made for the purpose of disseminating information as to
candidates and programs and publicizing the positions of the
unions on them. As to such expenditures an injunction would
pursuant to federal law which expressly declares that state law is superseded.”).
162. Id. (citation omitted).
163. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984). 
164. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
165. Id. at 743. 
166. Id. at 768-69. 
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work a restraint on the expression of political ideas which might
be offensive to the First Amendment.  167
Several years later, the Court again addressed this balance in
the context of public employees. In Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education,  a teachers’ union and school board had agreed to an168
“agency shop” arrangement under which teachers would not be
required to join the union but would be required to pay an “agency
fee” in the same amount as union dues.  A group of teachers sued169
to prevent the union from charging them for “economic, political,
professional, scientific, and religious” activities that were not
“collective bargaining activities.”  The Court began by tracing the170
societal benefits of the exclusive representation system, including
pragmatic benefits to both unions and employers.  However, the171
Court continued, those benefits had to be balanced against the
resulting burden on employees’ First Amendment rights.  After172
conducting that balancing, the Court held that “insofar as the
service charge is used to finance expenditures by the Union for the
purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment,” government employment could be condi-
167. Id. at 773.
168. 431 U.S. 209, 211 (1977).
169. Id. The NLRA does not cover government employees at any level. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)
(2006) (stating that the definition of “employer” under the NLRA does not include, inter alia,
“the United States ... or any State or political subdivision thereof”). But many states have
enacted statutes creating exclusive representation systems governing state and municipal
employees. For example, in Abood, the Michigan statute at issue was “broadly modeled after
federal law.” 431 U.S. at 223.
170. Abood, 431 U.S. at 213. 
171. Id. at 220-21 (identifying benefits as “avoid[ing] the confusion that would result from
attempting to enforce two or more agreements,” and “prevent[ing] inter-union rivalries from
creating dissension within the work force,” which would “eliminat[e] the advantages to the
employee of collectivization”).
172. Id. at 222 (“To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent
might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an employee’s freedom to
associate ... or to refrain from doing so.”). This problem could also be avoided, at least in part,
if workers were allowed simply to refuse to join the union or pay it any m oney, despite its
exclusive representative status. Indeed, this is the solution that so-called “right-to-work”
states have adopted. But, that solution has its own problems, in that it encourages free riding,
potentially destabilizing the union irrespective of its degree of actual employee support. See
Matthew Dimick, Paths to Power: Labor Law, Union Density, and the Ghent System , 90 N.C.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 15), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com /sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680900 (describing the free rider problem).
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tioned on paying the service charge.  But, public-sector unions’173
political and ideological advocacy could permissibly be funded only
by willing employees.  Thus, the Court struck a balance between174
unions—who must represent all workers within a particular
bargaining unit fairly, including those who oppose the union and do
not wish to be represented —and objectors.  175 176
The Abood Court refrained from deciding whether its First
Amendment analysis applied equally to private sector, NLRA-gov-
erned employees.  That question arose again in Communications177
Workers of America v. Beck.  In Beck, a group of private-sector178
employee-objectors argued that their duly elected union should not
be permitted to use portions of their agency fees for purposes
unrelated to collective bargaining or contract administration.  The179
Court ultimately avoided the constitutional question and held that,
as a matter of statutory interpretation, the NLRA permitted unions
and employers to require employees to become union members, but
the “‘membership’ that could be required had been ‘whittled down
to its financial core.’”  That financial core, the Court concluded,180
covered “the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to ‘per-
forming the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees
in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.’”  Thus,181
unions representing both public- and private-sector employees were
barred from spending mandatory dues or fees on their political
speech.
173. Abood, 431 U.S. at 225-26.
174. Id. at 235-36. 
175. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1952) (holding that NLRA imposes
duty of fair representation); see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) (“A breach of the
statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union’s conduct toward a member of
the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.”).
176. Abood, 431 U.S. at 221. 
177. Id. at 226 n.23 (“Nothing in our opinion embraces the ‘premise that public employers
are under no greater constitutional constraints than their counterparts in the private sector’
... or indicates that private collective-bargaining agreements are, without more, subject to
constitutional constraints.” (quoting id. at 245 (Powell, J., concurring))).
178. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
179. Id. at 739. 
180. Id. at 745 (citation omitted); see also NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742
(1963) (“‘Membership’ as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core.”).
181. Beck, 487 U.S. at 762-63 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S.
435, 448 (1984)).
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Since Abood, the Court has imposed increasingly onerous re-
quirements on unions in order to ensure that no money paid by
objectors is used for impermissible purposes.  For example, the182
Court has held that unions must take steps to avoid even the
temporary use of very small amounts of dissenters’ money for
political purposes, forbidding “forced exaction followed by a rebate,”
even when that situation is the result of a mere miscalculation by
a union of its anticipated political spending.  Likewise, the Court183
has rejected agency fee calculations that do not give objectors
“sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union’s fee,”184
and has required unions to provide “reasonably prompt” review “by
an impartial decision-maker” other than a court, such as an
arbitrator chosen jointly by the union and the objector.  Unions185
must also place in escrow any disputed funds; to use any of an
objector’s putative agency fee payment before the completion of the
dispute-resolution process requires an “independent audit” and
independent verification of the escrow amount.  186
In addition to these procedural requirements, the Court has
drawn fine—and sometimes unpredictable—lines governing what
expenses are and are not “chargeable” to objecting employees.  For187
example, political speech and lobbying are—unsurprisingly—
nonchargeable, with the exception of lobbying devoted to securing
ratification of a particular collective bargaining agreement.  Also188
nonchargeable are organizing activities, even though higher union
density means more leverage to improve wages and working
conditions,  and costs associated with conducting a strike that is189
182. These requirements are in addition to the reporting requirements imposed by the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 431 (2006), which requires
unions to annually file detailed reports including a variety of information about their internal
workings and decisions.
183. Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305-06 (1986).
184. Id. at 306.
185. Id. at 307 & n.20.
186. Id. at 310 & n.23.
187. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 231-32 (2000) (“Even in the context
of a labor union, whose functions are, or so we might have thought, well known and
understood by the law and the courts after a long history of government regulation and
judicial involvement, we have encountered difficulties in deciding what is germane and what
is not.”).
188. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 520 (1991). 
189. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 451-52 (1984).
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ultimately deemed illegal.  In contrast, chargeable expenses in-190
clude bargaining and processing grievances,  union conventions,191
union-sponsored social activities, those portions of union publica-
tions that discuss the union’s other chargeable activities,  prepara-192
tions for legal and illegal strikes,  and some litigation expenses193
incurred by national unions.  194
Thus, the Court has exhibited significant concern for the First
Amendment rights of union objectors and carefully sought to protect
their interests while maintaining the exclusive representation
system. Against this backdrop, this Article will next examine the
Court’s approach in Citizens United to the rights of dissenting
shareholders.
b. Citizens United’s Approach to Objectors
Citizens United addressed a different group of objectors—dis-
senting shareholders who do not want their money spent on
corporate political speech with which they disagree. There are,
however, significant parallels between shareholder objectors and
union objectors. In both cases, the objectors presumably hope to
benefit economically from their affiliation with either the corpora-
tion or the employer, and a relatively small amount of the objectors’
money can be spent on political speech. Yet, unlike in the union
context, the Citizens United Court sided with the corporate “associa-
tion” against the objector, rejecting shareholder protection as a valid
basis upon which to restrict corporate political speech. The Court
reasoned that the opposite conclusion would mean that the govern-
ment could “ban the political speech of even media corporations,”195
and that in any event, there existed “little evidence of abuse that
190. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 531-32.
191. Id. at 522.
192. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448-51.
193. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 532.
194. Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207, 217-18 (2009) (holding that a national union’s litigation
expenses are chargeable to local union members as long as “the subject matter of the national
litigation bears an appropriate relation to collective bargaining ... [and] the arrangement is
reciprocal—that is, the local’s payment to the national affiliate is for ‘services that may
ultimately inure to the benefit of the m embers of the local union by virtue of their
membership in the parent organization’” (quoting Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 524)). 
195. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010).
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cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of
corporate democracy.’”  In other words, the Citizens United Court196
held that shareholders who preferred not to have their money used
for political speech had two options—they could sell their stock, or
they could try to band together with a coalition of like-minded
shareholders to attempt to influence the corporation. This approach
differs sharply from that taken in the Abood-Hudson line of cases,
which emphasized that objectors should not be required to change
jobs or influence union policy to avoid funding objectionable political
speech.197
These outcomes reflect different approaches to weighing the First
Amendment interests at issue in the two contexts. In particular, the
Abood and Hudson line of cases balanced the objectors’ First
Amendment interests in refraining from undesired speech and
association against the government’s interests in labor peace—but
not against unions’ interest in engaging in political speech with
minimal encumbrance.  This explains the Court’s willingness to198
impose burdensome requirements on unions in order to protect
objectors, even when the benefit to the objector is small. Expensive
196. Id. Though the Court stated that these two reasons alone were “sufficient to reject this
shareholder-protection interest,” it also identified over- and underinclusiveness problems:
BCRA did not ban independent expenditures that took place outside of the thirty- or sixty-day
windows, even though that speech would presumably also offend the dissenting shareholders;
but it did apply to independent expenditures by corporations with only one shareholder, who
presumably would not disagree with his own speech. Id. 
197. See Jeremy G. Mallory, Still Other People’s Money: Reconciling Citizens United with
Abood and Beck, 47 CAL. W . L. REV. 1, 30-36 (2010); supra text accompanying note 174.
198. For example, in Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), the Court stated the countervailing
interests like this:
First, although the government interest in labor peace is strong enough to
support an “agency shop” notwithstanding its limited infringement on nonunion
employees’ constitutional rights, the fact that those rights are protected by the
First Amendment requires that the procedure be carefully tailored to minimize
the infringement. Second, the nonunion employee-the individual whose First
Amendment rights are being affected-must have a fair opportunity to identify
the impact of the governmental action on his interests and to assert a
meritorious First Amendment claim.
Id. at 302-03; see also Davenport v. W ash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 186 (2007) (“[O]ur
repeated affirm ation that courts have an obligation to interfere with a union’s statutory
entitlement no more than is necessary to vindicate the rights of nonmembers does not imply
that legislatures (or voters) themselves cannot limit the scope of that entitlement.”). As
discussed above, supra note 167 and accompanying text, Street is an exception, but apparently
a short-lived one.
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or onerous agency fee requirements are unlikely to undermine labor
peace, because they leave intact the exclusive representation
system. In other words, if there is no countervailing interest in
union speech to weigh against additional procedural protections for
objectors, then the calculation necessarily tips in favor of imple-
menting such protections. 
By contrast, in Citizens United, the Court weighed objectors’ First
Amendment interests against corporate First Amendment interests
and relied on shareholders’ abilities to avoid the unwanted speech
without impinging on corporate speech to conclude that additional
procedural protections for dissenters—the PAC requirement—were
impermissible. Analogously, it should be true that unions, as asso-
ciations, have significant First Amendment interests themselves,
and that imposing excessive procedural or compliance burdens on
union speech can amount to a First Amendment violation. Thus, the
problem with the Court’s agency fee jurisprudence, post-Citizens
United, is that it places significant burdens on unions’ use of their
own money for political purposes. 
Accordingly, courts should at minimum reweigh the value of pro-
cedures designed to protect objectors. On one side of the balance
should sit unions’ First Amendment interest in engaging in political
speech, unencumbered by government-imposed procedural hurdles.
But is there a First Amendment interest on the objectors’ side of the
equation? In the context of government employment, the answer
seems to be a clear “yes,” as the Court held in Abood.  However, in199
the private sector, it is less obvious that an agreement requiring
employees to fund union political speech involves the requisite state
action to implicate the First Amendment. The Court’s conclusion in
Hanson that state action was present even in private union-shop
agreements was predicated on the fact that the RLA preempted a
state right-to-work law, and the Ellis Court’s explanation-less state-
ment that the First Amendment applied generally also came in a
RLA case.  But, the NLRA does not preempt state right-to-work200
199. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 161-65. Additionally, in Air Line Pilots Ass’n v.
Miller, 523 U.S. 866 (1998), the Court introduced further ambiguity about the First
Amendment’s application in the RLA context. “The purposes for which a union may spend the
‘agency fee’ paid by nonmembers, however, are circumscribed by the First Amendment (when
public employers are involved) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or Railway
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laws, so if there is state action in the NLRA context, it must come
from somewhere else.  201
Those who argue in favor of applying the First Amendment in the
NLRA context generally argue that the necessary state action can
be found in the NLRA’s grant of exclusive bargaining rights,
because it is that status that gives rise to the union’s right to bar-
gain on behalf of objecting employees in the first place.  But, in the202
absence of any prohibition against unions and private employers
voluntarily negotiating an agreement that would provide for both
exclusive representation and a union shop, that argument seems to
beg the question.  203
Thus, there may simply be no First Amendment interest on the
objectors’ side of the equation when the objectors are: (1) in private
employment; (2) that is governed by the NLRA; (3) in a state
without a right-to-work law. If that is true, then it is difficult to see
how unions can constitutionally be prevented from entering into
union-shop agreements, even if some portion of the mandatory
dues or fees will be spent on political speech—much less how
unions could be compelled to comply with Hudson ’s onerous
procedural requirements.  This is not to say that unions have a204
Labor Act (RLA) (when private employers subject to their provisions are involved).” Id. at 868.
In the next sentence, the Court went on to say that the union “acknowledges that it is bound
by Hudson,” without mentioning that Hudson arose in the constitutional context or clarifying
that the Court was not deciding whether Hudson applies in the private sector in light of the
union’s concession. Id. at 869.
201. See Elena Matsis, Procedural Rights of Fair Share Objectors After Hudson and Beck,
6 LAB. LAW. 251, 259-60 (1990).
202. Id. at 260 n.43 (citing Brief for Respondents at 16 n.5, Commc’ns W orkers of Am. v.
Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (No. 86-637)); David H. Topol, Note, Union Shops, State Action, and
the National Labor Relations Act, 101 YALE L.J. 1135, 1149-57 (1992) (arguing that exclusive
representation under the NLRA implicates state action). 
203. Analogously, in the school voucher context, the Court determ ined that the First
Amendm ent is not violated when a parent’s “true private choice” to send his or her child to
a religious school is facilitated by statute, even though it would be a First Amendment
violation for the government to fund religious schools directly. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
204. Most of the courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have nonetheless held that
Hudson applies to unions operating under the NLRA. Tellingly, those decisions involve little
reasoning. For example, the D.C. Circuit simply stated,
[a]lthough in Hudson the challenge to the union agency fee was made on
constitutional grounds, its holding on objection procedures applies equally to the
statutory duty of fair representation inasmuch as the holding is rooted in
“[b]asic considerations of fairness, as well as concern for the First Amendment
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First Amendment right to agency fees. Rather, once a union
acquires an entitlement to either union dues or agency fees through
an agreement with an employer, Citizens United makes clear that
unions have a First Amendment right to spend the money to which
they are statutorily or contractually entitled on political speech,
without excessive administrative encumbrance.
Even when employee-objectors’ First Amendment rights are
implicated, Citizens United suggests that the elaborate procedures
Hudson imposed impermissibly burden unions’ speech. The Citizens
United Court was concerned about the difficulty of establishing a
PAC, which the Court called a “burdensome alternative,”  re-205
quiring, among other things, appointment of a treasurer, detailed
recordkeeping, and regular reporting, with which the PAC had to
comply “just to speak.”  These obligations constituted a First206
Amendment violation because they “necessarily reduce[d] the quan-
tity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”207
The Hudson reporting requirements are similarly burdensome, and
the Court has never weighed their usefulness in protecting objectors
against the limitations that they impose on unions’ ability to engage
in political advocacy.  At minimum, before imposing requirements208
rights at stake.”
Abrams v. Commc’ns W orkers of Am., 59 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting
Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306). Likewise, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, noted that
Hudson was a constitutional case, but then said, “[i]t is not obvious why this should make a
difference, however; in either case, the worker is entitled to reliable information about the
costs of representation, which are the only costs that he is legally obligated to pay.” Int’l Ass’n
of Machinists & Aerospace W orkers v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir. 1998); see also
Shea v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 154 F.3d 508, 513-15 (5th Cir. 1998)
(noting dispute as to whether the First Amendment applies in the NLRA context but
requiring Hudson procedures nonetheless). I have found only one circuit that has refused to
apply Hudson in the NLRA context; in Price v. Int’l Union, United Auto Workers, 927 F.2d 88
(2d Cir. 1991), the Second Circuit held that there were “no constitutional concerns which
warrant the safeguards found necessary in Hudson,” and instead required only that the union
not employ procedures for determining the amount chargeable to objectors that are “arbitrary,
discriminatory, or implemented in bad faith.” Id. at 92.
205. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 898 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam)).
208. See supra text accom panying notes 183-86. Additionally, it is worth noting that
litigation itself can be a burden on unions’ associational interests. Because the Court has
required that unions m ake extensive disclosures about their spending while placing
essentially no value on either unions’ First Amendment interests, or their interests in keeping
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designed to protect objectors in public or RLA-governed employ-
ment, courts should ensure that the requirements are narrowly
tailored and that they will be, on balance, sufficiently effective to
justify the burden on unions’ political speech.
One might posit that the analogy between objecting shareholders
and objecting workers is not an exact one. Most importantly, an
“average” objecting union member might, as a practical matter, be
unable to leave a job and sacrifice his or her income while hunting
for a new job. In other words, if union members have a much greater
need to retain their jobs than shareholders have to retain ownership
of their stock, then it will be easier for shareholders to simply avoid
unwanted speech altogether.  Yet, it is not clear that every209
stockholder will be able to avoid having his or her money used for
unwanted political expenditures. First, some stock is subject to
restrictions on its sale, making it impossible, or at least difficult, to
sell off quickly.  Second, for mutual fund holders, it may be210
difficult even to discern those corporations in which one owns stock,
much less to then trace the political expenditures of each such
corporation. Third, shareholders may have to choose between selling
off stock at a loss, if they can find a buyer at all, and avoiding
confidential their internal workings, it is easy for an employee with no particular reason to
believe that a union has misused agency fees to tie a union up in lengthy litigation, and to
learn significant amounts of information about the union’s spending in the process. 
209. The Court noted this difference in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 794 n.34 (1978), when it distinguished dissenting shareholders from dissenting union
members: 
The critical distinction here is that no shareholder has been "compelled" to
contribute anything. Apart from the fact, noted by the dissent, that compulsion
by the State is wholly absent, the shareholder invests in a corporation of his own
volition and is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason.
A more relevant analogy, therefore, is to the situation where an employee
voluntarily joins a union, or an individual voluntarily joins an association, and
later finds himself in disagreement with its stance on a political issue.
210. See, e.g., G. Edgar Adkins, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Martin, Restricted Stock: The Tax Impact
on Employers and Employees, 107 J. TAX’N 224 (2007) (describing restrictions on sale of stock
issued to a company’s employees and executives). Likewise, purchasers of shares bearing a
“restrictive legend” may be unable to sell their shares for some period of time, or may have
to comply with a set of regulatory requirements in order to have the restrictive legend
removed. E.g., Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. AT&T Corp., 320 F.3d 1081, 1084 (10th Cir.
2003) (concluding that the stock transfer restriction contained in a joint operating agreement
was lawful); 12 W ILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5455 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2004) (discussing validity of restrictions
on right to transfer stock).
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unwanted speech. And some of those shareholders, such as some
retirees, may be dependent on investment income for survival.
Thus, as both a legal and a practical matter, selling stock could
sometimes be as difficult—or even more difficult—than leaving a
job.
To illustrate Citizens United ’s potential impact on how unions in
both the public and private sector should treat workers’ dues and
fees, one need only examine the outcomes in two of the Court’s
recent cases, Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n  and211
Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n.  212
At issue in Davenport was a Washington state statute that pro-
hibited unions from using nonmembers’ fees for election-related
speech without the nonmembers’ affirmative consent.  Thus, the213
statute in Davenport was more protective of objector rights than
Hudson and Ellis, which put the burden on the objector to inform
the union of his objection.  The Court first observed that Washing-214
ton could have simply eliminated the requirement that bargaining
unit members pay any fee by adopting a right-to-work scheme.215
From there, the Court easily concluded that if unions have no right
to agency fees in the first place, they have no right to be free from
burdensome agency fee collection procedures: “[t]he constitutional
floor [articulated in Hudson] for unions’ collection and spending of
agency fees is not also a constitutional ceiling for state-imposed
restrictions.”  The Court continued, “[w]hat matters is that public-216
sector agency fees are in the union’s possession only because
Washington and its union-contracting government agencies have
compelled their employees to pay those fees.”  Finally, the Court217
stated that there was “no suppression of ideas ... afoot, since the
union remains as free as any other entity to participate in the
electoral process with all available funds other than the state-
coerced agency fees lacking affirmative permission.”218
211. 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
212. 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009).
213. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 180.
214. Id. at 181; Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984).
215. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 184.
216. Id. at 185.
217. Id. at 187.
218. Id. at 190. 
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Ysursa also involved a state’s attempt to regulate unions’ use of
dues and fees for political, but not other, purposes. In that case, an
Idaho statute imposed criminal penalties on unions that funded
political activities with money automatically deducted from gov-
ernment employees’ paychecks.  Thus, although unions could use219
funds received through automatic paycheck deductions for nonpoliti-
cal speech, they had to collect separately any money to be used for
political speech. Again, the Court upheld the law, holding that
government “is not required to assist others in funding the expres-
sion of particular ideas, including political ones.”  220
It is difficult, to say the least, to reconcile Davenport and Ysursa
with Citizens United. The “greater includes the lesser” argument
—that because the states could adopt a right-to-work statute, they
could also burden unions’ use of dues and fees—was implicitly
rejected in Citizens United, as follows. As the Citizens United dis-
sent pointed out, corporations are creatures of law that could, in
theory, be outlawed altogether.  Yet, corporations have First221
Amendment rights—and under Citizens United, the state cannot
create corporations on the condition that they do not engage in
political speech. Likewise, it would seem that states could not create
an entitlement to agency fees, which could then be spent on political
advocacy, but then place substantial hurdles on unions’ use of those
fees for political speech.
Thus, Citizens United has substantial potential to change not
just what unions are permitted to say but also with what money
they can say it. But, “substantial potential” does not always equal
constitutional change. The next section discusses some possible
objections to the analysis described thus far.
III. OBJECTIONS
The impact of congressionally created and judicially endorsed
restrictions on labor speech has been to deprive labor of some of its
more effective tools, and, to some extent, to prevent it from working
effectively with other groups on issues of broad importance. For
219. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1096-97 (2009). 
220. Id. at 1098.
221. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949-50 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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example, as the Court itself has acknowledged, picketing is an
effective form of communication precisely because, unlike other
forms of communication such as handbilling, it is difficult for
passersby to avoid seeing the message being conveyed by simply
looking away.  Likewise, secondary and sympathy strikes, as well222
as “hot cargo” agreements, can be effective methods of advocacy, not
only in terms of encouraging one employer to put pressure on
another, though certainly that is not to be underestimated, but also
in generating cross-union solidarity. Furthermore, depriving labor
of avenues to communicate with workers and put pressure on
employers is bound to have an impact on unionization rates—a
concern not only of labor unions but also of the large number of
workers who would like to belong to a union but do not.
This Article has argued that Citizens United’s articulation of First
Amendment principles might provide a foothold for labor unions to
achieve greater First Amendment protection. However, as should be
clear from the foregoing, a successful result under Citizens United
is far from a foregone conclusion for multiple reasons. For example,
even without Citizens United, it is difficult if not impossible to rec-
oncile existing labor speech doctrine with First Amendment cases
arising in other contexts —yet the distinctions have proven223
resilient, albeit with shifting rationales.  There is certainly no224
reason to believe that the current Court is inclined to make
decisions that benefit unions. Thus, it is entirely possible that courts
will arrive at the conclusion that the real import of Citizens United
in the labor relations context is to bolster employers’ property and
speech rights. This conclusion might, for example, lead them to
222. Edward J. Bartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 576 (1988); see also Ryan & Davis, supra note 145, at 149-50.
223. Compare, for example, International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied International,
Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226 (1982), with NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 925
(1982), or Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 504 (1949), with Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969). Supra Part II.B.1.a; see also Charlotte Garden, Labor
Values Are First Amendment Values: Why Union Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected
Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2632-44 (2011).
224. In this doctrinal area, Chief Justice Roberts’s admonition that the importance of stare
decisis is undermined when “its rationale threatens to upend our settled jurisprudence in
related areas of law, and when the precedent’s underlying reasoning has become so
discredited that the Court cannot keep the precedent alive without jury-rigging new and
different justifications to shore up the original mistake,” seems to have clear relevance.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
48 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:001
strengthen employers’ rights to hold political “captive audience”
meetings with their employees  or to invalidate NLRA-imposed225
restrictions on what employers can say to workers during union
election campaigns.  Alternatively, the Court could simply cut back226
on its broad articulation of First Amendment principles by holding
in a future case that Citizens United does not apply outside the
context of election-related speech. 
Finally, there is another basis upon which courts may avoid
applying Citizens United in the manner outlined above—perhaps
the most likely one. That is that maintaining the stability of com-
merce is a compelling interest that justifies existing restrictions on
labor speech, especially secondary activity. This reasoning has a
lengthy pedigree in labor law, dating back to the enactment of the
NLRA. Because of its multi-decade history, this Article will describe
this reasoning in more detail before suggesting a modern-day
answer to it.
A. The NLRA and Protection of Commercial Stability
Labor law’s impact on commercial stability has long played a role
in the Court’s analysis of unions’ rights. Until 1932, unions were in
a tenuous legal position, subject to prosecution under the antitrust
laws for striking and picketing, even after the Clayton Act pur-
ported to exempt unions from antitrust liability.  Furthermore, the227
courts had demonstrated a willingness to enjoin workers’ collective
action.  Thus, unions had few legal protections until Congress228
passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act,  and then the NLRA.  But, the229 230
drafters of the NLRA—encouraged by many labor movement
lobbyists—premised the statute on the Commerce Clause and made
225. See Paul M. Secunda, Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace Meetings in
the Post-Citizens United Environment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 17, 17 (2010),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/5/15/secunda.html.
226. See, e.g., NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1941).
227. See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 292-96 (1908); Garden, supra note 223, at
2624-25.
228. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 123 (1998).
229. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2006).
230. Id. §§ 151-69.
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clear that national policy favored unionization as a path to economic
prosperity and away from labor unrest.  231
Predictably, employers resisted the NLRA, both on the street and
in the courts.  In court, the NLRB did not attempt to re-cast the232
case as one about the constitutional rights of workers or unions.233
Instead, it argued that the NLRA was valid as “an exercise of the
power of Congress to protect interstate commerce from injuries
caused by industrial strife.”  As the NLRB litigated the case, the234
real issue was whether Congress could “anticipate” disruptions in
interstate commerce caused by strikes and other labor activity
—both in general and as applied to the particular employers whose
conduct was at issue in the cases—or whether Congress was limited
to dealing with disruptions once they had already occurred.  235
The Court vindicated the government’s position in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp. based on the NLRA’s impact on commercial
stability.  Though the Court described the right of employees to236
“organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes” as a
“fundamental right” necessary to “give laborers opportunity to deal
on an equality with their employer,”  it focused primarily on the237
231. Id. § 151 (“It is ... the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.”).
232. Jam es Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor
and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 60-61
(2002) (describing employers’ reactions to the W agner Act, which included flatly ignoring it
based on the employers’ conclusion that the Act was unconstitutional and launching
“campaigns of lawsuits” to enjoin the law).
233. See Brief for Petitioner at 10-13, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937) (No. 419). Constitutional rhetoric was common in the labor movement, as unions and
workers articulated a vision of constitutional rights for labor, including rights to organize and
strike, under the First and Thirteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Pope, supra note 232, at 4-5.
Nonetheless, there existed little or no precedent upon which the Board could have relied in
support of a constitutional argument. It also would have been difficult for the government to
argue that the NLRA was necessary to protect constitutional rights that were barely
acknowledged in the statute itself.
234. Pope, supra note 232, at 10.
235. Id. at 10-11.
236. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
237. Id. at 33.
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“injury to commerce” that the NLRA sought to remedy.  Then, in238
the course of a lengthy discussion of the impacts on interstate
commerce, the Court stated that “the recognition of the right of
employees to self-organization and to have representatives ... is
often an essential condition of industrial peace.”  Ultimately,239
however, the Court concluded that it was “dealing with the power
of Congress” to articulate its “particular polic[ies].”  240
In the years following the NLRA, the Court seemed more willing
to find constitutional rights where labor unions were concerned. For
example, the Court held that labor picketing  and organizing241 242
were both robustly protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Moreover, the Court held that wages and working conditions
were matters of public importance of the first order; thus, in
Thornhill v. Alabama, the Court stated broadly that “[f]ree discus-
sion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor
disputes appears to us indispensable to ... shape the destiny of
modern industrial society.”  243
But, this significant expansion of labor rights, including labor
speech rights, was not permanent. In the mid-1940s, Congress
became concerned with what it perceived as excesses committed by
labor unions and passed the LMRA.  In the LMRA, Congress244
stated its finding that 
[i]ndustrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of
commerce ... can be avoided or substantially minimized if
employers, employees, and labor organizations each recognize ...
one another’s legitimate rights ... and above all recognize under
law that neither party has any right in its relations with any
other to engage in acts or practices which jeopardize the public
health, safety, or interest.245
238. Id. at 22.
239. Id. at 42.
240. Id. at 46.
241. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940).
242. Thomas v. Collins , 323 U.S. 516, 536-37 (1945) (holding that First Amendment
protects peaceful labor organizing activity and reversing criminal conviction of union
organizer).
243. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 103. 
244. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
245. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2006).
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Thus, the NLRA’s focus on commercial stability was amplified, and
labor rights were expressly subordinated to the “public interest,”246
which surely did not benefit from labor strife. Federal labor policy
shifted from a pro-unionization and collective bargaining orienta-
tion—albeit one in the service of commercial stability—to a neutral
one.
This policy shift was then reflected in subsequent cases. A par-
ticularly good example of such a case is American Communications
Ass’n v. Douds, which concerned the constitutionality of the LMRA’s
anticommunist affidavit provision. The Court began by recounting
the “constitutional justification” for the NLRA, which it character-
ized flatly as “the power of Congress to protect interstate com-
merce,” and the related goal of the LMRA, to eliminate union
practices that “preven[t] the free flow of goods ... through strikes
and other forms of industrial unrest.”  One such deleterious union247
practice was the “political strike,” which “subordinat[ed] legitimate
trade union objectives to obstructive strikes when dictated by
[Communist] Party leaders, often in support of the policies of a
foreign government.”  Accordingly, the anticommunist affidavit248
requirement was tied to the “public interest” by decreasing the
likelihood that a union would call a “political” strike.  249
The Court concluded without discussion that “[t]here can be no
doubt that Congress may, under its constitutional power to regulate
commerce among the several states, attempt to prevent political
strikes,” and that lawful goal “bears reasonable relation” to the
affidavit requirement.  Furthermore, though the Court initially250
acknowledged that First Amendment rights were at issue,  it251
246. Id.
247. 339 U.S. 382, 387 (1950) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151).
248. Id. at 388. 
249. Id. at 388-89. One effect of the LMRA’s affidavit requirement was to purge communist
sympathizers from labor union leadership, hastening the labor movem ent’s turn toward a
narrower focus on bargaining with individual employers, rather than a broader focus on
workers as a class. See Seymour Martin Lipset, The Law and Trade Union Democracy, 4 VA.
L. REV. 1, 4-10 (1961) (discussing “two sides” to the labor movement, describing business
unionism and social movement unionism, and discussing the role of communist leadership in
unions). Thus, depending on one’s perspective, the requirement created either a vicious or a
virtuous cycle in which the law and unions’ own leadership combined to de-politicize the labor
movement. 
250. Douds, 339 U.S. at 390-91. 
251. Id. at 393 (noting that the requirement “lessens the threat to interstate commerce, but
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concluded that the affidavit requirement itself “does not interfere
with speech” because the purpose of the requirement was aimed at
“substantive evils of conduct that are not the products of speech at
all.”  Most tellingly, though, the Court went on to explain that,252
because unions derive many of their rights from Congress in the
first place, Congress must be afforded some leeway to burden
unions: “[I]t is plain that when Congress clothes the bargaining
representative ‘with powers comparable to those possessed by a
legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom
it represents,’ the public interest in the good faith exercise of that
power is very great.”  In other words, what Congress gave,253
Congress can take away—particularly when both the giving and the
taking are designed to improve interstate commerce.  254
Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that, viewed against the
backdrop of the NLRA’s and the LMRA’s focus on commerce, the
Court has been willing to restrict labor speech in service of commer-
cial stability. Put another way, if one accepts, as the Douds Court
did, that there is “no doubt” that Congress can ban strikes that have
a political rather than economic purpose, then it would not require
any particular leap of logic to conclude—as the Court did in Allied
International —that unions’ politically motivated secondary255
strikes are entitled to less constitutional protection than economi-
cally motivated strikes, not more. 
This Article has argued that the “greater includes the lesser”
argument that was at work in Douds and cases like it is no longer
tenable under Citizens United.  But in its place, the Court could256
hold simply that the protection of commerce is a sufficiently
compelling interest to justify the incursion into unions’ First
Amendment rights. Although this would avoid overturning a broad
it has the further necessary effect of discouraging the exercise of political rights protected by
the First Amendment”).
252. Id. at 396.
253. Id. at 402 (quoting Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944)).
254. Though the Court eventually struck down the affidavit requirement, it did so on the
ground that the statute was a bill of attainder, while simultaneously affirming that “Congress
undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to
keep from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who m ay use such positions to
bring about political strikes.” United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 449-50 (1965).
255. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
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swath of labor law, it would face an uphill battle in light of unions’
changed circumstances since the LMRA. In short, it would be
difficult to show that a blanket prohibition on union secondary
activity is necessary to protect the public interest and to prevent
commercial unrest, particularly in cases where the activity is
secondary picketing that calls for a consumer boycott.  Instead, at257
minimum, courts should inquire as to the threats to commercial
stability posed by forbidden activities, and then craft narrowly
tailored remedies designed to target the harm. 
CONCLUSION
Since the Court announced its decision in Citizens United,
commentators on the left have decried the decision for its potentially
far-reaching and negative impact on American democracy. But, the
Citizens United Court’s articulation of general First Amendment
principles, as applied to corporations, has potentially significant
consequences for labor unions in at least two areas—advocacy,
including secondary activity and associated picketing, and union-
shop agreements. If this promise comes to fruition, then Citizens
United itself may ultimately result in stronger unions that are more
effective corporate adversaries. Although this is by no means a
complete solution to the problem of corporate and special interest
spending in the American political process, it could mitigate one
aspect of that problem—the amplification of only one side’s voice in
the political arena.
257. Some, but not all, such activity is already permissible. Compare NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers & W arehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 71 (1964) (picketing in support
of secondary consumer boycott permissible under NLRA when pickets made clear that boycott
was against only one item sold by retailer, and not against retailer itself), with Safeco, 447
U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980) (finding that Fruit & Vegetable Packers exception does not apply when
target of picketing is the primary good or service sold by neutral employer).
